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SUMMARY
High-interest informal moneylending can serve a 
useful purpose in developing countries, helping those 
without the means to access credit from formal financial 
institutions. However, the high charges for these informal 
loans can lead to people being caught in a debt trap 
and losing their assets. Legislation, interest rate caps, 
and debt relief have shown very limited effectiveness 
in combating the problem. More common is promoting 
access to credit for the poor through microfinance 
institutions (MFIs), i.e. microcredit, or through community-
based financial organisations (CBFOs). Each of these 
has advantages and disadvantages. Microcredit can 
bypass the ultra-poor or, alternatively, it may be given to 
those unable to repay the loans, trapping them deeper 
in poverty. In addition, engaging in microcredit can lead 
to people using high-interest informal moneylenders to 
pay back the MFI loans. CBFOs generally rely on people 
forming savings groups and recycling the funds as loans. 
They have strengths (e.g. promoting a savings culture) 
and weaknesses (e.g. offering limited financial products), 
but there is little evidence of their impact specifically on 
people’s use of high-interest informal moneylending. 
Overall, this literature review highlights the need for more 
research on how high-interest informal moneylending 
operates in different contexts, and what interventions 
could be effective in combating it.
High‑interest informal moneylending
Use of high-interest informal moneylenders (commonly 
referred to as ‘loan sharks’) is widespread in many 
developing countries. While such loans can be simple 
and accessible, particularly when people need cash 
quickly (e.g. to deal with a crisis, to overcome liquidity 
constraints during certain seasons), very high interest 
rates are charged. These rates are generally too high 
for investment in business, and the poor can end up 
in a debt trap and lose critical assets such as land and 
even face violence if they cannot make the repayments. 
It can also lead to people becoming trapped in bonded 
labour, which can persist across generations. The 
available evidence indicates that informal high-interest 
moneylending is prevalent in Bangladesh, Myanmar and 
Nepal – with interest rates especially high in Myanmar. 
Negative consequences, including loss of assets, 
violence, homelessness and even suicide, are seen in all 
three countries. 
The major factor driving the use of high-interest informal 
moneylenders is that people who are poor or who have 
low incomes lack access to credit through formal financial 
institutions. This can be due to them living in remote 
locations, lack of verifiable income, lack of collateral and/
or illiteracy and, on the part of banks/financial institutions, 
lack of profitability.
Countermeasures
There are three broad measures that can be taken to 
combat high-interest informal moneylending: legislation, 
debt relief, and increasing access to credit for the poor. 
While there are examples of national/subnational-level 
legislation specifically to combat high-interest informal 
moneylending (loan sharks) – such as in India – this 
review found little evidence of implementation and 
enforcement. A related approach being tried by some 
governments is setting interest rate caps. However, 
capping is an inefficient tool to lower interest rates, is 
hard to enforce against unlicensed moneylenders, and 
can curtail access to credit. One example of the latter 
approach, i.e. debt relief, is the Debt Conciliation Boards 
set up in the Indian state of Haryana, which have the 
power to declare debts fully discharged if the debtor 
has repaid double the principal (amount borrowed). The 
challenge is to ensure that deserving debtors get relief.
This review focuses on interventions to enable the poor 
to access credit through less exploitative sources. There 
are two key approaches for this: (a) microcredit through 
microfinance institutions (MFIs), and (b) community-
based financial organisations (CBFOs).
Microcredit
Microcredit is the provision of small loans to poor/low-
income people/enterprises, in order to help them generate 
income/smooth consumption/protect against risks, and 
thereby alleviate poverty. The concept gained prominence 
through Muhammed Yunus and Grameen Bank, which he 
set up in Bangladesh in 1983. Over the next two decades 
there was a huge expansion in the microfinance sector, 
particularly in South Asia, which now accounts for around 
half of global active borrowers of microcredit. 
Characteristics of microcredit include: 
• Loans are usually of small amounts, with short 
repayment periods and a tight repayment schedule 
(usually weekly or monthly, starting immediately 
after the loan is given). 
• Rather than using assets as collateral, microcredit 
relies on joint group liability – borrowers form 
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groups who thereby create pressure on individual 
members to repay.
• Microcredit also offers dynamic incentives: 
borrowers who make repayments on time and in 
full can then access increased credit. 
• Microcredit particularly targets women: over 80 per 
cent of global borrowers are women.
Challenges – MFIs were initially largely 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) funded by 
donors, but pressure grew on them to become financially 
viable. This led to the commercialisation of MFIs, with 
many becoming ‘for-profit’ entities. This in turn created 
tension between the drive for profitability (high interest 
rates) and the goal to reach and support the poorest in 
society. MFIs have also been criticised for bypassing 
the ultra-poor, preferring to lend to relatively richer 
households with less risk of default. Conversely, MFIs 
are blamed for encouraging over-borrowing by already 
vulnerable groups, leading to over-indebtedness and 
making their situation even worse. 
Impact on use of moneylenders – Ironically, in 
situations where microcredit leads to indebtedness on 
the part of borrowers (where they struggle to make 
repayments) it can lead to (renewed) use of informal 
moneylenders. There is some evidence that MFI clients 
use informal finance to manage their finances. A 2016 
study by Berg, Emran and Shilpi in Bangladesh on the 
impact of microcredit on moneylender interest rates and 
use of moneylenders, found that rates did not go down 
but MFI households were borrowing significantly less from 
moneylenders. They concluded that MFIs were reaching 
the better-off households, while moneylenders retained 
the relatively poorer and riskier households.
Community-based financial 
organisations (CBFOs) 
CBFOs provide a range of financial products and services 
to a small target market in a limited geographic zone. 
They are able to overcome the ‘outreach’ problem faced 
by many MFIs because of the latter’s high transaction 
costs. As low-cost organisations, CBFOs can reach 
those in sparsely populated rural areas, and are able to 
provide small pools of capital to large numbers of people. 
They often operate in remote areas, are self-formed and 
self-governing, rely partially or wholly on volunteers, and 
are primarily savings driven, mobilising funds from their 
members. There are different types of CBFOs, varying by 
size, ability to mobilise funds, when they distribute funds, 
if and how much interest they pay on deposits and charge 
on loans, and the range of products they offer.
CBFOs have a number of strengths: (a) as mentioned 
above, they have greater outreach than MFIs in reaching 
very remote areas; (b) they promote local ownership 
which leads to greater trust and empowerment; 
(c) through compulsory payments, they encourage a 
savings culture; (d) they are easily replicated; and (e) by 
grouping together, CBFOs can become attractive enough 
to form links with the formal financial sector (allowing 
access to larger loans and other financial products).
However, CBFOs also have weaknesses: (a) it is hard 
for CBFOs to generate a big pool of funds, which in turn 
limits the products and services they can offer; (b) they 
often charge higher interest rates than commercial 
financial institutions; (c) they require considerable 
technical assistance and training at the outset, and then 
continued monitoring and oversight; (d) being self-
managed by locals often on a pro bono basis, they can 
lack financial management skills and governance can be 
weak, which could lead to mismanagement of funds; and 
(e) they are vulnerable to elite capture. 
The literature reviewed did not provide evidence on 
the impact of CBFOs on use of high-interest informal 
moneylending.
Role of donors 
Microcredit programmes
Seen as a tool for poverty reduction, microfinance and 
microcredit has been a significant area for donor support; 
for example, by the World Bank. However, the findings 
from evaluations of donor microcredit programmes are 
generally disappointing. A 2006 evaluation by Richard 
Rosenberg of the World Bank and United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) microcredit portfolios 
concluded that most were unlikely to produce long-lasting 
results (judged in terms of loan repayment and cost 
recovery). Another synthesis of evaluation findings focusing 
on client income and expenditure (Kovsted, Andersen 
and Kuchler 2009) reported ambiguous results from 
peer-reviewed journal studies, but more positive effects in 
donor evaluations; however, the latter never reached the 
ultra-poor and were dependent on donor subsidies. None 
of the impact evaluations included the use of high-interest 
informal moneylending as a performance indicator. The 
literature shows a clear tendency to attribute at least some 
responsibility for the shortcomings of microcredit on the 
donor agencies that have promoted MFIs. 
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Good practice guidelines for donor support of 
microcredit include: (a) MFIs should pay for themselves, 
financed by attracting domestic deposits and recycling 
them into loans and other financial services; (b) donors 
should only provide grants or loans on a temporary basis 
to build institutional capacity of MFIs; (c) donors should 
focus on capacity building, including ensuring accurate 
reporting on financial and social performance; and (d) it 
should be taken into consideration that for the ultra-poor, 
microcredit might not be the answer – other kinds of 
support (e.g. social protection) might work better.
Evaluations of donor support for CBFOs (revolving 
funds) found that, even though these had easier 
standards than MFIs, ratings were still low. Savings-
based groups and self-help groups were more careful 
with lending and collection than those using donor funds, 
but even with these results were weak. 
Good practice guidelines for donor support of 
CBFOs include: (a) consider whether providing quick 
access to external credit directly to CBFOs may be 
counterproductive, undermining a savings culture; 
(b) CBFOs should be locally owned, with external 
agencies only filling capacity gaps as needed; (c) CBFOs 
should not be supply driven, i.e. put under pressure to 
meet donor disbursement requirements when they lack 
the capacity to do so; (d) clear monitoring and evaluation 
systems should be in place, even for small CBFOs; and 
(e) consider whether it would be more practical for donors 
to support large numbers of CBFOs through second-tier 
organisations such as NGOs. 
Other areas for donor support: Research and 
understanding of high-interest informal moneylending, 
especially in the South Asian context, is very limited. 
Donors could support such research, which in turn would 
help inform design of policies and programmes to combat 
informal moneylending. The approaches discussed in 
this report – promoting access to credit through MFIs 
and CBFOs – can help combat the problem, but their 
main objective is poverty reduction. Donors could support 
interventions that more directly combat high-interest 
informal moneylending. 
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1 INTRODUCTION
High-interest informal moneylending is a major problem 
in many developing countries, including in Asia. This 
report looks at interventions to combat such lending and 
evidence of their effectiveness. The aim is to support the 
Child Labour: Action Research Innovation in South and 
South Eastern Asia (CLARISSA) research programme 
led by the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), and 
help inform policymaking in target countries, notably 
Bangladesh, Myanmar and Nepal. 
The report is structured as follows. Section 2 examines 
the problem of high-interest informal moneylending, 
and the negative effects this has on borrowers and their 
families. It also looks at the factors driving use of such 
informal moneylending, as well as legislative and other 
policy measures by governments to address the problem. 
One approach is to give poor people access to credit, 
so they do not need to turn to high-interest informal 
moneylenders. Such interventions fall into two broad 
categories: (1) provision of microcredit through MFIs and 
(2) CBFOs, of which there are a range. Section 3 focuses 
on MFIs, looking at how these have developed, the main 
features of microcredit, the challenges involved, and the 
impact of microcredit provision on poverty reduction. 
Section 4 looks at CBFOs and describes the different 
types, along with their overall strengths and weaknesses. 
Section 5 looks at the role donors are playing and can 
play in supporting microcredit provision for the poor, 
and CBFOs. 
1.1 Methodology 
The evidence in this report was identified through a rapid 
desk-based search. The literature reviewed was a mixture 
of academic papers and grey literature, including reports 
1 See Acknowledgements section.
by development agencies. Key databases searched 
included Google, Google Scholar, and Scopus. Key 
search terms included ‘informal moneylenders’, ‘loan 
sharks’, ‘microcredit’ and ‘community-based finance 
organisations’ as well as the geographical focus regions/
countries (‘South Asia’, ‘Bangladesh’, ‘Nepal’, and 
‘Myanmar’). The review also drew on newspaper articles, 
blogs, think tank pieces and webpages where relevant. In 
addition, a number of experts in the field were identified 
and approached for recommendations and contributions.1 
There were considerable limitations in the literature. 
Literature on the scale, distribution, and impact of 
high-interest informal lending, as well as legislative and 
other policy measures to counter it, was very limited. 
Considerable literature was found on microfinance and 
microcredit, including some on its impact on high-interest 
informal lending. There was also literature on the different 
types of CBFOs, but the review found little specifically 
discussing the impact of CBFOs on high-interest informal 
lending. Finally, limited literature was found on the role of 
international development partners in promoting MFIs and 
CBFOs. Overall, the evidence base on the problem of 
high-interest informal lending and interventions to combat 
it is weak. 
With regard to the focus countries for this review 
– Bangladesh, Myanmar and Nepal – literature on 
high-interest informal lending was limited for all three. 
However, Bangladesh is covered extensively in the 
literature on MFIs and microcredit, as well as CBFOs. Far 
less was found on Myanmar and Nepal. The literature 
reviewed was gender blind to some extent: women only 
specifically featured in the literature on MFIs (which 
target women) and CBFOs, as well as in individual stories 
of people negatively affected by high-interest informal 
moneylending. 
Section 2:
HIGH-INTEREST 
INFORMAL 
MONEYLENDING
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2 HIGH‑INTEREST INFORMAL 
MONEYLENDING
2.1 Nature and scale 
High-interest informal moneylenders (aka ‘loan sharks’) 
are prevalent in many parts of the developing world and 
typically meet urgent needs. Such loans have been the 
traditional source of credit in many poor communities, 
particularly in rural areas (Jacoby 2008). This review 
found negligible recent literature on the spread and scale 
of such lending. Aryeetey reports that it is widespread in 
most of rural West Africa: 
[T]he clientele is wide ranging, including 
farmers, market women, other traders, non-
farm entrepreneurs and other self-employed 
craftsmen. Farmers sometimes borrow money 
from moneylenders during the planting season to 
maintain their households until the next harvest. 
They may also borrow for expenditure on funerals 
and other social events (Aryeetey 1998: 11). 
The appeal of borrowing through ‘loan sharks’ lies in 
the fact that it is readily accessible and is rarely tied 
to collateral. This in turn means that it is based on the 
moneylender having proximity to borrowers and local 
knowledge to assess their creditworthiness (Thomas 
1992: 13). Loans from moneylenders are typically 
extended to clients of long standing (World Bank 1989: 
114). Loans can often be obtained at short notice and 
tend to be short term, with high interest rates. One 
example is the five–six arrangement under which the 
borrower receives $5 in the morning and repays $6 in the 
evening, at an interest rate of 20 per cent (ibid.: 113). 
2.1.1 Exploitation…
The high interest rates associated with moneylenders 
(and pawnbrokers) are in part due to the high costs 
(moneylenders use their own funds for lending) and risks 
associated with informal loans (e.g. moneylenders must 
maintain adequate liquidity to meet demand for loans 
in a timely manner, but some of that will be idle in slack 
periods) (World Bank 1989: 114). However, the high 
2 www.antislavery.org/slavery-today/bonded-labour/
3 The studies/programmes were carried out in Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar in India and in Nepal. For reports see:  
www.ids.ac.uk/projects/modern-slavery-in-india-and-nepal/
interest charges can also stem from the power imbalance 
between borrowers and lenders, and the latter can use 
intimidation and violence to secure repayments (Aliber 
2015: 42). Borrowing from loan sharks can lead to people 
becoming caught in a debt trap and losing critical assets 
like land (Ritchie 2007). For example:
Moneylending in India has retained much of its 
negative image up to recent times, especially in 
rural areas. Accusations are still rife that rural 
moneylending is applied perniciously to dispossess 
people of their land, especially Dalits (so-called 
‘untouchables’) and members of the scheduled 
tribes. A vivid manifestation of this pressure are the 
intermittent spates of suicides committed by farmers 
in the rural areas around Nagpur who are indebted 
to moneylenders and who cannot repay their loans 
when the harvest fails (Indian Express, 13 February 
1999) (Aliber 2015: 41–42).
In some parts of the world, particularly South Asian 
countries, it can lead to debt bondage, whereby lenders 
keep piling on interest, and borrowers cannot repay the 
amount and are forced into labour to pay off the debt 
(which keeps mounting because of the exorbitant interest 
charges).2 Oosterhoff and Sharma (2018) describe how 
landless labourers become trapped in bonded labour 
after borrowing money from their landlords (often to pay 
for a family member to emigrate in the hope of better 
livelihoods). IDS carried out a number of studies and 
programmes in South Asia on bonded labour, and one 
of the aspects looked at was the link between this and 
high-interest loans.3 The studies consistently found strong 
links between loans and bonded labour, with moneylenders 
being one of the most common sources of loans. The two 
most common reasons given by participants in the studies 
for taking high-interest loans were disease (ill health) and 
marriage (e.g. Oosterhoff et al. 2019: 55). In many parts 
of India and Pakistan, this has led to whole generations 
being trapped in bonded labour, as the unpaid debt is 
passed from the parents to their children. People in debt 
bondage typically work in very harsh conditions and can 
face physical and even sexual abuse.
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2.1.2 … or vital service?
While high-interest informal lending is seen as 
exploitative, it is important to note that for the poor it can 
also represent a convenient and flexible way to meet 
short-term financing needs. Ghate describes the work of 
Sikh moneylenders in the Philippines as 
doing their rounds on motorcycles with bags of 
cash hanging from their shoulders, redistributing 
as loans what they had just collected… they 
managed to collect and disburse unsecured loans 
with absolutely no recourse if a borrower refused to 
pay. Clearly, they were perceived to be providing a 
valuable service (Ghate 2015: Chapter 4).
Even for those who could access bank loans, 
moneylenders can be preferable because the transaction is 
based on a personal relationship, and has a much simpler 
application process (no long bank queues, documentation 
to provide, forms to fill in, or delays in waiting for a decision) 
(Aliber 2015: 10). Moreover, the high interest rates are ‘now 
rationalised as necessary to compensate the moneylender 
for the seriousness of the risk borne, the screening costs 
incurred by the moneylender, and the high level of the 
opportunity cost of the moneylender’s capital’ (ibid.). 
Parussini (2015) describes the vital role of informal 
moneylenders in fuelling India’s massive informal 
economy: ‘Despite their high rates they provide the credit 
that fuels India’s informal sector, which accounts for about 
Box 1: Negative effects of loan sharks in Ecuador 
Loan sharks in Ecuador are known as chulcos. A particularly infamous group of chulcos 
operates out of Guayaquil, where they are known for their motorcycles, their Colombian 
origin, and their 20 per cent compounded monthly interest rate. This group of chulcos is 
as efficient as any financially self-sustaining microfinance organisation: they promote their 
services with flyers, divide up the city into quadrants, each with its own assigned chulco, 
and they police their quadrants on motorcycles for new or delinquent borrowers. They are 
much like any reputed microfinance organisation… except for the fundamentally exploitative, 
violent, and illegal nature of their work. 
Guayaquil is the biggest and most dangerous city in Equador, and a high number of 
local crimes are attributed to this type of organised predatory lending. The trouble with 
illegal lending is that wronged borrowers are powerless to report chulco misbehaviour 
to the authorities. And unfortunately, it is more than a fear of reprisal that keeps these 
crimes from being reported: it is a need for continued access to credit, at any price. 
Chulcos or chulqueros charge annual interest rates as high as 150 per cent (and in the case 
of chulcos in Guayaquil, 791.61 per cent annual compounded), imposing truly unfair and 
abusive loan terms on borrowers.
The danger of borrowing from these loan sharks is twofold. First and foremost, they take 
advantage of vulnerable small business owners, simultaneously depriving them of the 
benefits of lending from accredited institutions while engaging in exploitative and illegal 
practices. Chulcos lack all the benefits of legitimate microlending institutions, such as 
establishing a credit history to ensure continued access to credit in the future. Furthermore, 
the inordinately high interest rates tend to trap borrowers in a cycle of debt, borrowing 
repeatedly only to pay off their existing loans. Lending from chulcos means a life of 
repayment; the capital never even pays off. Not to mention the inherent dangers of lending 
from loan sharks, who take drastic measures to ensure they collect their money, whether 
through threats, public humiliation, leaving pigs’ heads on doorsteps, seizure of other family 
members’ assets (in some cases, all of their assets), or outright violent and illegal actions.
Source: Based on Bennett, K. (n.d.) ‘Loan Sharks, Microloans and the Highest Interest Rates Around (They Aren’t on Kiva)’,  
https://pages.kiva.org/blog/loan-sharks-microloans-and-the-highest-interest-rates-around-they-arent-on-kiva
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half of the nation’s economic output. And they operate 
outside the rules that often restrict bank credit.’ Unable to 
access banks because of lack of collateral, unregistered 
moneylenders are the main source of funding for small 
businesses and individuals. Parussini quotes Shamika 
Ravi, a leading Indian economist: ‘Moneylenders can’t be 
replaced: they perform a key function in the market’ (ibid.).
Thomas (1992: 13) concludes: ‘[T]he view of the money 
lender as an exploiter of the poor and helpless needs to 
be investigated carefully before judgement is passed.’ 
Aliber makes a similar point: ‘[T]he modern trend is 
to doubt both the extent of monopoly power and the 
exploitative character of such lending’ (2015: 10).
2.2 Informal moneylending in 
Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Nepal 
This review was unable to find evidence about the 
precise scale of high-interest informal moneylending in 
the CLARISSA focus countries: Bangladesh, Myanmar 
and Nepal. However, media reports and other sources 
(notably development organisations) indicate that the 
problem is widespread in all three countries and has 
significant negative effects on borrowers. 
2.2.1 Bangladesh
Informal moneylenders have long had a place in 
Bangladeshi rural communities (EASO 2017: 74). 
According to the European Asylum Support Office 
(EASO), the interest rates charged by moneylenders 
are far higher than those for microcredit and bank loans 
(ibid.). Moreover, many traditional moneylenders use 
violence and threats to enforce repayment: 
[F]ailure of repaying debts can led [sic] to the 
vicious circle of loaning from other moneylenders, 
losing homesteads and agricultural land, bondage, 
or in the most extreme case by the sale of organs. 
Sometimes the debtors ‘went into hiding to escape 
wrath of usurers’. There are also reports that people 
committed suicide after being harassed by debt 
collectors (EASO 2018: 5).
A newspaper article from 2012 describes the situation in 
Jhenidah district (Harinakundo upazila):
Throughout the district, stories of helpless poor 
peasants getting entangled in the vicious traps of 
loan sharks are widespread… Intimidated, harassed 
and often assaulted by the loan sharks, many 
debt-ridden farmers and poor people in the area 
have left home and gone into hiding. Many people 
have lost their homesteads and agricultural lands as 
these gangs, prowling the villages with ready cash, 
had entangled them into a vicious cycle of loan and 
its unbelievably high interest. 
In two unions of Harinakundu, loan sharks have 
lured scores of farmers into their nets, keeping them 
in the dark about exorbitant amounts of interest 
(Rehman 2012).
2.2.2 Myanmar
Numerous media articles indicate that high-interest 
informal moneylending is a particularly serious problem 
in Myanmar. An Al Jazeera report (2018) estimates 
that 85 per cent of households in Yangon’s poorest 
neighbourhoods borrow money from loan sharks just 
to survive. Interest rates on such loans are very high: 
estimates range from 10 per cent per month (Finch 2012) 
to 20 per cent per month (Myanmar Business Today 
2017) to as high as 50 per cent a month (Arnold 2018). 
A former UN Habitat staffer and consultant on urban 
poverty, Mike Slingsby, says Myanmar has the worst 
levels of informal household debt in the region: ‘I’ve never 
come across such bad conditions in terms of people 
being in the hands of money lenders, both in terms of the 
percentage and the rates of interest’ (Myanmar Business 
Today 2017). As people struggle to make the repayments, 
they become trapped in an evergrowing cycle of debt. 
One direct consequence of this is children being sent out 
to work (Al Jazeera 2018; Arnold 2018). 
The widespread use of loan sharks stems from the 
country’s limited formal financial sector and the fact that 
‘access to fairly priced credit remains beyond the reach 
of a large proportion of Myanmar’s citizens’ (Myanmar 
Business Today 2017). An economist who has studied the 
issue in the country, Sean Turnell, notes: ‘Far and away 
the majority of people in Myanmar have no relationship 
with a formal bank, or an ability to borrow from them’ 
(Finch 2012). 
2.2.3 Nepal
Evidence on the prevalence of informal moneylending in 
Nepal is limited. A 2005 study of the Eastern Terai region 
found that well over half of the households surveyed 
had informal loans – largely because they lacked 
collateral like land and hence could not access formal 
lending institutions – and over 60 per cent of these were 
from moneylenders (Haugen 2005: 5). A study by the 
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UN Capital Development Fund of financial services in 
Nepal reported that use of informal moneylending in the 
country was on the decline, as the formal financial sector 
improved (MicroSave 2014: 17). However, recent media 
reports on informal moneylending in Nepal suggests that 
it is a growing problem in the country (Chhatyal 2019). 
Estimates of interest rates on such loans range from 
24 per cent per annum in the Eastern Terai study 
(Haugen 2005: 5), to 60 per cent per annum (Amnesty 
International cited in Chhatyal 2019). In their participatory 
action research study in Nepal, Sharma, Oosterhoff and 
Burns (2019: 12) found that in one village most people 
in the community did not own property which they could 
use as collateral for a bank loan, and hence they had 
‘to go with their own landlord or money lender in [the] 
community, who charge[s] 40 to 60 percent interest per 
annum’. Moreover, ‘Due to the high interest rates, they 
cannot pay back their debt in time’ (ibid.). 
Negative consequences of people becoming caught 
in debt traps to loan sharks include loss of assets, 
bankruptcy, homelessness, and even people 
committing suicide. Oosterhoff and Sharma (2018) 
note: ‘Moneylenders in small villages in Nepal often 
treat their impoverished clients terribly. They may seize 
their property, call in government authorities or employ 
violence – whatever leverage is necessary to recover the 
loans they have made, often at exorbitant interest rates.’ 
According to one Nepali academic: ‘The massive network 
of loan sharks and fraudsters has resulted in dangerous 
situations in which many people have turned homeless 
while some have been forced to commit suicide. Such 
cases are on the rise because the police administration is 
not taking required action’ (cited in Chhatyal 2019). Civil 
society activists claim the reason for police inaction, and 
for few complaints of illegal moneylending even being 
made to the police, is the powerful nexus between loan 
sharks and local politicians and officials (ibid.). 
2.3 Driving factors 
The key factor driving use of high-interest informal 
moneylending is lack of access to credit through formal 
financial institutions such as banks, i.e. to a lack of 
financial inclusion on the part of many poor and low-
income people. Poor people’s inability to get bank loans 
can be due to several reasons: 
• The nearest bank branch could be too far away for 
them to travel to (takes too long and/or costs too 
much to get there); 
• They have insufficient funds to open a savings 
account or maintain a minimum balance; 
• They do not have collateral (e.g. house deeds or 
land ownership deeds) to secure a loan; 
• They are self-employed and have no verifiable or 
regular source of income; 
• They are illiterate/poorly educated and hence unable 
to complete the requisite paperwork (CARE n.d.). 
Lack of collateral is a key constraint. Jacoby (2008: 2) 
explains that informal moneylenders thrive in settings 
where collateral is scarce or legal enforcement of debt 
contract is weak or non-existent. Banks can also be 
reluctant to loan money to the poor because it can be 
uneconomic for them: loan amounts and thus profits are 
generally low, and administrative costs on numerous 
small loans can be high – they would prefer to lend larger 
amounts to fewer, richer borrowers.
In the context of West Africa, Aryeetey notes that ‘credit 
from moneylenders is often the most expensive credit 
available; hence the demand for it usually comes from 
persons without any other options. Such credit remains 
the only source of informal credit that does not require 
borrowers to satisfy specific membership requirements’ 
(1998: 11).
2.4 Links between formal and informal 
credit providers 
The literature highlights two key ways in which formal 
and informal credit markets can be linked and interact 
with/influence each other (Jacoby 2008). The first 
is a vertical structure whereby moneylenders act as 
middlemen, borrowing from the formal sector and then 
lending the funds on to borrowers who cannot access 
such credit. Banks and other formal financial institutions 
will, as noted above, be reluctant to lend to poor people 
without collateral. However, ‘the suppliers of loans in 
the informal sector usually possess enough assets to 
qualify as credit-worthy to the lending institutions in the 
formal sector, which often serve as their source of funds’ 
(Bose 1998: 266). Unlike formal sector lenders, informal 
moneylenders are not deterred by lack of collateral since 
‘due to their power, position and personal relationships 
within the village community, and their informational 
advantage from being insiders, [they] enjoy lower 
enforcement costs, and can also differentiate amongst 
their clients according to risk of default’ (ibid.). In such a 
scenario, the moneylenders effectively become a channel 
for bank/formal financial institution funds. Arp, Ardisa and 
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Ardisa (2017) describe how this works in the case of MFIs 
in Indonesia. Their paper aggregates findings from two 
studies in Indonesia to try to explain why informal high-
interest moneylending can still thrive when low-interest 
microfinance is widely available. They find that when 
poorly managed, microfinance initiatives can provide 
entrepreneurship opportunities for ‘middlemen’: people 
who more easily qualify get microcredit from MFIs and 
then use the funds to lend to poorer borrowers. Arp et al. 
(2017) call this phenomenon ‘informal intermediation’. 
They note that poor staff management facilitates – even 
fosters – informal intermediation. Loan officers know 
that some borrowers will use the funds to lend to others, 
but because they know these informal intermediaries 
will reliably pay back their loans, they still lend to them. 
The authors (ibid.) even found collusion between loan 
officers and intermediaries, as well as former loan officers 
becoming informal lenders themselves. 
The second arrangement is one in which bankers (formal 
sector lenders) and moneylenders compete with one 
another, with residual (unfulfilled) demand for credit from 
the formal sector spilling over to drive borrowing from 
informal moneylenders (Jacoby 2008). The literature 
describes two phenomena in this regard: one where 
moneylenders coexist with formal sector lenders by 
virtue of exogenous ceilings on formal sector credit (Bell, 
Srinivasan and Udry 1997; Kochar 1997); and the other 
where moneylenders’ informational advantage over banks 
allows coexistence in equilibrium without formal sector 
credit rationing (Jain 1999; Giné 2005). Jain notes that 
‘the formal sector’s superior ability in deposit mobilisation 
(due to economies of scale and scope, and the security of 
deposit insurance) is balanced against the informational 
advantage that the informal sector enjoys’ (1999: 420). 
The informational advantage of the moneylender stems 
from the fact that they either reside in the same village 
or locality as their clientele, and are thus more likely to 
have much more personal knowledge of and contact with 
them than would a bank, or are simultaneously dealing 
with their borrowers in another market (Jacoby 2008: 2). 
Because of proximity the moneylender will have a better 
idea of whether a borrower can successfully implement 
a given project and thus repay a loan (ibid.). In addition, 
moneylenders may more readily exchange information 
about borrowers’ repayment histories than banks in 
developing countries (ibid.). 
Maitra et al. (2020) highlight the role that certain nodal 
individuals in a community can play in ensuring the 
success of agricultural credit programmes. Under 
agent intermediated lending (AIL), selection of local 
beneficiaries is delegated to an intermediary from within 
the community. The approach seeks to ‘leverage the 
intermediary’s specialized information and connections 
with local residents, while avoiding the pitfalls associated 
with elite capture’ (ibid.: 1). The authors compare the 
impact on borrowers’ productivity and income of lending 
through AIL conducted by trader lenders and by people 
with political connections. They find that the former – 
borrower selection through local trader agents – leads 
to higher productivity and income, which they suggest 
is due to them helping more able borrowers to reduce 
their unit costs and increase output. By contrast, agents 
with political connections helped less able borrowers 
and reduced their default risk. Repayment rates for both 
beneficiary selection routes were similar, illustrating the 
importance of local knowledge – ‘informational advantage’.
2.5 Countermeasures 
There are three broad measures that can be taken to 
combat high-interest informal moneylending: 
• Using legislation to ban/control the practice, and 
enforcing this; 
• Providing debt relief to debtors; and 
• Increasing access to credit for the poor.
While there are examples of national/subnational level 
legislation specifically to combat high-interest informal 
moneylending (loan sharks), this review found little 
evidence of implementation and enforcement. In Nagpur, 
India: 
Despite legislation such as the Bombay 
Moneylenders Act of 1946 (extended to the whole 
of modern Maharashtra state by 1960), which 
requires moneylenders to sign up with the Registrar 
of Moneylenders and also imposes interest rate 
ceilings, many moneylenders – especially those 
catering to lowing-income [sic] clients – operate 
outside of these regulations (Aliber 2015: 42). 
Indian states generally require that moneylenders are 
registered and have a licence: rules establishing the 
maximum amount of interest charged (see below) vary 
from state to state, as do penalties for failing to provide 
account statements to debtors and for intimidating them 
(Parussini 2015). Despite this, ‘large amounts of credit 
flow from unregistered moneylenders’ (ibid.). 
Bangladesh has no specific law banning usury, but 
there are anti-usury provisions and measures for the 
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protection of borrowers in different laws (EASO 2018). 
The Bangladesh Moneylenders Act 1940 limits repayment 
to twice the principal of the original loan and sets annual 
interest rate caps of 10 per cent on unsecured loans 
and 8 per cent on secured loans (ibid.: 4). In Nepal, 
Oosterhoff and Sharma (2018) note that: ‘By law, annual 
interest rates by moneylenders or middlemen cannot 
exceed 10 per cent, and the total sum owed over a period 
of time cannot exceed the original amount which you 
borrowed – but the law is routinely ignored.’ 
A related approach tried by some governments is setting 
interest rate caps. These ‘can protect consumers from 
usury and exploitation by guaranteeing access to credit at 
reasonable interest rates and to facilitate prosecution of 
exploitative and deceptive lenders’ (Maimbo and Gallegos 
2014: 3). Rate caps are generally more applicable 
to banks and MFIs than to informal moneylenders – 
though, as noted above, in Indian states maximum 
interest charges are set out for registered moneylenders. 
Arguments against the use of interest rate caps include 
that they are an inefficient tool to lower interest rates, they 
limit access to credit, reduce transparency, and decrease 
product diversity and competition (ibid.). Critically, they 
can lead to financial entities lending to clients with higher 
collateral, and curtailing lending to those who need it 
most and have little access to alternative sources of credit 
(ibid.). In this way they can push low-income borrowers 
to turn to unlicensed moneylenders, at a much higher 
interest rate (ibid.). 
The effectiveness of measures such as interest rate 
caps is also limited by the linkages between formal and 
informal lenders, described above. Both in the vertical 
structure, whereby informal lenders use credit from 
the formal sector as funds to lend on to the poor, and 
in horizontal arrangements, where banks and informal 
moneylenders operate side by side in competition, 
policies such as interest rate controls and subsidies will 
have little impact on informal moneylenders. Jain (1999: 
434–5) notes that much of the empirical literature on 
the efficacy of monetary policy in the presence of active 
informal credit markets is premised on the difficulty of 
implementing interest rate regulations in informal  
markets. 
Some countries have approached the problem of high-
interest moneylending from the other direction, namely 
debt relief – helping people to pay off their debts so they 
4 http://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=Debt_Settlement_Board
5 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Debt_Conciliation_Board
are free of the clutches of unscrupulous moneylenders. 
A historic example of this was the Debt Settlement 
Boards set up in Bengal (India) in the 1930s to deal 
with the problem of drought and depression leading to 
increased rural indebtedness, and to peasants losing their 
lands (to the landlords or moneylenders from whom they 
had borrowed).4 The Boards would hear both parties and 
give relief to indebted farmers mainly by scaling down 
their outstanding debts, or declaring the debtor insolvent 
(thereby relieving him of the debt), or by allowing the 
scaled down debts to be paid in easy instalments over a 
period of up to 20 years. The Boards were most effective 
in areas where peasants were relatively weak socially 
and politically: in areas with strong peasant organisations, 
they had little interest in going to the Boards. However, 
in the long run, the Boards led to the traditional rural 
credit market shrinking; this in turn led to a decline in 
acreage and in food production – some scholars have 
even claimed this was a factor in the famine of 1943. The 
Boards were closed in 1944. 
A similar more recent example is the Debt Conciliation 
Boards set up in Haryana, India for implementation of 
the Haryana Debt Relief of Agricultural Indebtedness 
Act 1989.5 In 2007, the state government announced a 
fund of Indian rupees 60,000 crore to waive agricultural 
loans. The Boards were set up in each district to distribute 
this relief by identifying deserving candidates. They 
are mandated to provide relief not only to debtors of 
cooperative banks, cooperative societies, and commercial 
and nationalised banks, but also of private creditors 
and moneylenders. Any debtor who has paid back more 
than double the principal can take their case to a Debt 
Conciliation Board, which has the power to declare the 
debt fully discharged. Alternatively, if the debtor can 
make a payment so that the total paid back is double 
the principal, the debt will be cleared; or the Board can 
order a repayment schedule based on the payment 
capacity of the debtor. In practice, the Boards have 
been criticised for being ineffective in providing relief to 
those who deserve it. The government has also been 
accused of having a ‘lackadaisical attitude’ to the problem 
because many political leaders have their own agents in 
rural markets who act as moneylenders to farmers. The 
Bangladesh Debt Settlement Act 1989, created to protect 
farmers from falling into indebtedness to moneylenders, 
contains several provisions against usury crime practices 
(EASO 2018: 4).
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As outlined above, legislative and debt relief approaches 
to the problem of high-interest informal moneylending are 
limited, both in their use (as indicated by the negligible 
literature on these), and in evidence of effectiveness. 
Hence, this review focuses on interventions to promote 
financial inclusion and access to credit for the poor. 
Given the predominance of financial exclusion – and 
specifically lack of access to credit – as a driving factor in 
high-interest informal moneylending, such interventions 
are critical. The two main approaches to increasing 
access to credit are through MFIs (microcredit) and 
through CBFOs. 
Section 3:
MICROFINANCE 
INSTITUTIONS 
AND MICROCREDIT 
Interventions to Combat High-Interest 
Informal Moneylending
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3 MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS 
AND MICROCREDIT
3.1 Definitions and objectives
Microfinance is the provision of basic financial services 
including loans, savings, money transfers, and insurance 
to households and micro-enterprises with limited or no 
access to banks and other formal financial institutions 
(Beck 2015: 3; CARE n.d.). Promoting financial inclusion 
enables poor and low-income people to fund activities to 
generate income, to build assets, stabilise consumption 
and protect against risks: it can play an important role in 
improving the lives of the poor.
Although the terms ‘microfinance’ and ‘microcredit’ are 
often used interchangeably, they are distinct. Microfinance 
refers to the broader concept of financial services 
covering loans, saving, insurance, transfers, and other 
products; microcredit refers specifically to the provision 
of small loans. These are aimed at the poor to help them 
establish or expand an income-generating activity, and 
thereby escape from poverty (Mehta and Bhattacharya 
2018; Bates 2011; CARE n.d.). 
In relation to high-interest informal moneylending, 
microfinance targets the poor – those usually lacking 
land or other collateral – who also constitute the bulk of 
clientele for moneylenders (Berg et al. 2016: 2). MFIs can 
thus create effective competition for the moneylenders: 
The availability of microcredit at relatively lower 
interest rates without any collateral allows poor 
households to substitute away from the high 
interest rate loans from traditional moneylenders 
and landlords. Microcredit thus is expected to drive 
down the moneylender interest rate and eventually 
drive them out of business as the microcredit market 
deepens (ibid.: 2–3).
MFIs include NGOs, credit unions, cooperatives, sectors 
of government banks, and even commercial banks (see 
below). MFIs draw their funds largely from banks and 
other formal financial institutions, as well as international 
donors. As discussed below, there has been a big push to 
make them financially self-sustaining and to wean them 
off their dependence on external funding.
3.2 Key features of microcredit 
The typical characteristics of microcredit are as follows:
• Short-term loans – Loans are usually relatively 
short term, less than 12 months in most instances 
and often even six months or less, and generally 
for working capital.
• High repayment frequency – Repayments start 
immediately and there is high repayment frequency 
(regular weekly or monthly repayments). This is 
because people on low incomes can struggle to 
accumulate cash over longer time periods. 
• Dynamic incentives – Loans are usually quite small 
to begin with, typically in the range of US$100–500. 
As borrowers regularly repay their loans and 
demonstrate their creditworthiness, they become 
eligible for larger loans. The promise of being able 
to borrow again and larger amounts serves as a 
disciplining tool for borrowers and helps reduce 
risks for the lending institution. 
• Joint liability lending – The traditional lender’s 
requirements for physical collateral such as 
property are usually replaced by a system of 
collective guarantee (or solidarity) groups whose 
members are mutually responsible for ensuring 
that their individual loans are repaid. [Alternatively, 
borrowers may be requested to find one or two 
personal guarantors – often these are respected 
local community leaders.] Joint liability can 
both have an insurance function, and serve as a 
screening and monitoring mechanism (ensuring 
money is spent properly) (see below).
• Simple procedures – Loan application and 
disbursement procedures are designed to be 
easy for the poor – they are simple to understand, 
locally provided, and quickly accessible with 
minimal paperwork. Loans are disbursed promptly 
after approval.
• Focus on women – Microcredit is disproportionately 
aimed at women, who tend to be financially 
excluded to a greater extent than men: around two 
thirds of microfinance clients worldwide are women 
(see below) (Beck 2015: 7–9; CARE n.d.).
Two characteristics of microcredit provision merit further 
attention. The first is lending to solidarity groups, or 
individuals with personal guarantors. This has proved 
remarkably successful in terms of loan repayment – 
repayment rates are around 97 per cent, making them 
higher than those of commercial banks lending to wealthy 
borrowers (CARE n.d.). The approach works because of 
a number of factors (ibid.): 
• Peer monitoring – members can monitor what 
others do with their money and ensure that they 
use the money wisely. 
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• Social ties – individuals who fail to repay their loan 
will face social pressure from other members of 
the community, and the desire to avoid this can be 
a powerful incentive to make the repayments. 
• Group pressure – if one member of the group 
defaults the others can expel him/her from the 
group, thus depriving them of access to credit. 
The second is the targeting of women, who are usually 
among the most vulnerable and poorest in society. 
Microcredit can promote women’s empowerment by 
giving them opportunities to earn (additional) income, 
in turn raising their status within their household and 
community, and boosting their self-esteem and self-
confidence, and giving them a greater voice. Another 
reason for targeting women is that they have been shown 
to spend a greater share of their income on the welfare 
of their households than men (CARE n.d.), leading to 
improvements in health, nutrition, and education. Over 
the long term, as women have become organised through 
microfinance, they have tackled issues such as domestic 
violence. A further reason that MFIs target women is 
because they have proved to be more reliable borrowers 
and more likely to repay promptly than men (ibid.).
3.3 History and development of MFIs
Lending money to the poor was long seen as problematic: 
the high costs involved, lack of collateral, high risk of 
default, and the fear that already poor people would 
become further impoverished by taking on debts, all 
discouraged microcredit. The change in these perceptions 
– so that microcredit was seen as something that could 
help the poor – is attributed to Muhammed Yunus, an 
economist in Bangladesh. 
Visiting poor villages there in the early 1980s, Yunus 
came up with the theory that lending small amounts to 
villagers would help increase self-employment and reduce 
poverty. He began by lending US$27 to several women, 
and earned 83 cents interest on the loans, proving the 
concept could be viable. In 1983 Yunus set up Grameen 
(meaning ‘village’) Bank. By 2007, Grameen Bank had 
made more than US$6bn in loans to micro-entrepreneurs 
with no access to traditional banking. 
It is important to clarify that Yunus did not ‘invent’ the 
concept of microcredit: this had been around in diverse 
forms and countries for many decades prior to Grameen 
Bank – for example, Accion, working independently in 
Latin America, developed a similar idea in the 1970s 
(Wykstra 2019). Nonetheless, Yunus and Grameen 
Bank did pave the way for countless others to provide 
microcredit and other services: investors and donors 
poured money into microfinance and, by 2015, over 
3,000 organisations around the world were reported to be 
providing microcredit to the poor (ibid.). While many were 
found in India and Bangladesh, MFIs were set up across 
the developing world. Figure 1 shows the rapid rise in 
microcredit borrowers.
As of 31 December 2010, 3,652 MFIs reported reaching 
205,314,502 clients, 137,547,441 of whom were among 
the poorest when they took their first loan (Maes and 
Reed 2012: 3). Of these poorest clients, 82.3 per cent, 
or 113,138,652, are women (ibid.). The Microfinance 
Barometer 2019 (Convergences 2019: 2) reports that 
in 2018, 139.9 million borrowers benefited from the 
services of MFIs, up from 98 million in 2009. Of these, 
80 per cent are women and 65 per cent are rural 
borrowers, proportions that have remained stable over 
the past ten years, despite the increase in the number 
of borrowers (ibid.). The 2019 report also notes that 
South Asia continues to dominate global microfinance: 
it is the region with the largest number of borrowers 
(85.6 million in 2018), with this number growing faster 
than in other regions (+13.8 per cent between 2017 
and 2018) (ibid.). In 2018, 54 per cent of global active 
borrowers of microfinance were from South Asia (Mehta 
and Bhattacharya 2018: 155). South Asia also has the top 
three markets in terms of borrowers: India, Bangladesh 
and Vietnam (Convergences 2019: 2).
Many MFIs started off as non-profit entities – mostly 
NGOs and often donor driven – which were unregulated 
Source: Microcredit Summit Campaign 2015 report, in 
Wykstra (2019).
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Figure 1: Rise in global microcredit borrowers
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(Beck 2015). In the 1980s, the prevailing free market 
ideology led to a push for financial sustainability on the 
part of MFIs and growing stress on weaning them off 
long-term donor support. ‘It was felt that the poor should 
pay the full cost of any support received, rather than 
impose an additional tax burden on others.’6 There was 
a drive for MFIs to cover their own costs through greater 
commercialisation, private ownership, and profit-driven 
incentives with market-based interest rates (discussed 
further below). ‘It was thought that market forces 
and profits would ensure financial self-sustainability, 
generating a cost-free increase in the supply of 
microfinance to the poor.’7
The ‘commercialisation’ or transformation of an MFI refers 
to a change in its legal status from unregulated non-profit to 
regulated, for-profit institution. Regulated MFIs differ from 
non-profit institutions in that they are held to performance 
and capital adequacy standards and are supervised by a 
financial authority, typically the central bank of the country 
where they are registered or microfinance regulatory 
authority.8 For-profit MFIs are sometimes referred to as 
non-banking financial companies (NBFCs). MFIs are now 
generally for-profit entities: NBFCs, specialist commercial 
microfinance banks, or microfinance departments of larger 
commercial banks (CARE n.d.). Leading MFIs include: 
Accion International (started in Latin America but now 
works globally), BRAC9 (Bangladesh), FINCA10 (operating 
largely in Latin America and Africa), Freedom from Hunger 
(works in countries across Latin America and Africa, as 
well as in India), Grameen Bank (Bangladesh), and Kiva 
(operates globally – in 77 countries).
3.4 Challenges 
3.4.1 Push for financial viability: poverty reduction vs 
profitability
As noted above, one of the main challenges facing 
MFIs is financial viability: giving small loans to large 
numbers of poor borrowers, who typically require a lot of 
support from MFI staff, and carry a high risk of defaults 
on loan repayments, does not generate profits. Long-
term dependence on banks or donors is not considered 
sustainable. In order to meet their costs, and in the case 
of for-profit entities, to earn revenue MFIs have to charge 
interest from their borrowers. 
6 https://microfinanceinfo.com/micro-financial-institutions/
7 https://microfinanceinfo.com/micro-financial-institutions/
8 https://microfinanceinfo.com/micro-financial-institutions/
9 Building Resources Across Communities.
10 Foundation for International Community Assistance.
This leads to the second challenge of how high to set 
interest rates. What level of interest is acceptable and 
what is exploitative? Some argue that MFIs should charge 
market rates, but others note that the main objective 
of MFIs is to help the poor (and empower women) and 
hence they should keep interest rates low (Beck 2015: 
18). On average, MFIs offer loans at annualised interest 
rates of around 20–30 per cent though some rates are 
much higher (Wykstra 2019). Again, some (including 
Yunus) argue that interest rates above a certain level 
mean MFIs have turned into ‘predatory loan sharks’; 
others counter that the high rates are necessary to cover 
the costs of sustainably lending to the poor (ibid.). The 
fierce debate between microfinance advocates focused 
more on the social and outreach side, and those focused 
on the profitability side is illustrated by the argument 
between Mexican Compartmentos, the first commercial 
MFI to go public, and Muhammed Yunus who criticised 
Compartmentos for charging too high interest rates 
(almost 100 per cent per annum) (Beck 2015: 18).
One analysis, written in 2012 in the wake of the Andhra 
Pradesh MFIs crisis (see below), highlighted the worry 
‘that microfinance has taken a wrong turn, that it has 
drifted away from its original mission, that is had [sic] 
been co-opted (or even corrupted) by the pursuit of size 
and profitability’ (Andrew Hilton cited in Maes and Reed 
2012: 11). Hilton argued that microfinance and individual 
MFIs were at a tipping point: 
Will the industry continue to evolve – to grow, to 
offer new products, to move up market – until it 
is essentially indistinguishable from conventional 
financial institutions (banks, consumer finance 
companies, etc.)? Or will it rediscover its roots as 
a more modest source of small-scale credit to a 
relatively limited market amongst lower-income 
groups in generally poor countries? (ibid.)
3.4.2 Not reaching the poorest
The drive for profits can also lead MFIs to move away 
from the very poorest in society, since these are the 
people who typically borrow the least, entail the highest 
transaction costs and are the most likely to default. But 
this clearly undermines the objective behind MFIs which 
is to help lift people out of poverty.
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This failure by MFIs to reach the ‘poorest of the poor’ 
would appear to be confirmed by extensive empirical 
evidence from Bangladesh. Berg et al. (2016: 38) cite 
recent evidence from multiple data sets which show 
that a household with less than ten decimal of land has 
a much lower probability of becoming an MFI member, 
and another study which found that as MFI coverage 
increased in a village in Bangladesh progressively richer 
households became MFI members. The authors say 
this reflects the demand on loan officers to maintain 
high repayment rates and rigid repayment schedules: 
‘It is widely discussed that the loan officers exclude 
households if they do not have a steady source of income 
to ensure weekly repayments’ (ibid.). Berg et al. claim that 
Bangladesh is not unique in this: ‘[T]he tendency to attract 
relatively richer households with MFI penetration has been 
widely noted in other countries’ (ibid.: 39). This point is 
echoed by Arp et al. (2017) who note that loan officers in 
MFIs have an incentive to focus on quantitative outcomes 
such as number of loans provided and rollovers of ‘safe’ 
loans, rather than on funding the poorest borrowers. 
Consequently, ‘the poorest of the poor... benefit less than 
the less poor do’ (ibid.: 112), and this reinforces existing 
socioeconomic hierarchies in these countries. In the case 
of Bangladesh, the fact that the ultra-poor were being 
bypassed by microcredit led BRAC to design specialised 
asset transfer programmes for them: the Targeting the 
Ultra-Poor (TUP) programme started in 2002. 
3.4.3 Driving indebtedness 
Conversely, the other charge levelled against MFIs is 
that they lend to those who cannot afford to borrow, and 
thus burden them with debts. In other words, microcredit 
ends up causing more harm than good. Microcredit 
is most effective when provided to people who have 
already identified a productive and profitable economic 
opportunity, have the necessary entrepreneurial skills and 
can use credit (loans) to set up/further their business and 
are capable of making regular repayments (Mehta and 
Bhattacharya 2018: 161). By contrast, ‘providing credit to 
those who cannot use it productively could push already 
vulnerable poor people into debt and in fact worsen their 
situation’ (ibid.; CARE n.d.). This was the experience of 
the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh (see Section 3.5) and 
of South Africa: the microfinance movement took off after 
the end of apartheid in the country in 1994 but was largely 
used for consumption spending rather than enterprises 
(Bateman 2013). As a result:
With few poor individuals possessing a secure 
source of income stream that might ensure full 
repayment of a microloan… many of the poorest 
individuals have been forced to repay their 
microloan by selling off their household assets, 
borrowing from friends and family, as well as simply 
taking out new microloans to repay old ones…. 
South Africa’s poor are now caught in a micro-debt 
trap of unimaginable proportions (ibid.).
Estimates are that 40 per cent of the South African 
workforce’s income is spent on repaying debt (Bateman 
2013). Bateman (ibid.) attributes a lot of the problems 
with microcredit in South Africa to the extensive 
commercialisation of the sector in order to make it 
financially self-sustaining. He notes that the underlying 
assumption that private banks and MFIs would be 
responsible ‘proved to be spectacularly wrong’.
According to Mehta and Bhattacharya (2018: 154), the 
frequent and tightly structured repayment schedule that 
MFIs typically impose on poor borrowers means the latter 
‘find it difficult to invest borrowed money into projects that 
have long gestation period [sic] as the repayment begins 
long before the return on investment is realized’. 
3.4.4 Microcredit pushing people into arms of 
loan sharks
Ironically, in situations where microcredit leads to 
indebtedness on the part of borrowers (where they 
struggle to make repayments) it can lead to (renewed) use 
of informal moneylenders. Meyer (2002: 357) notes that 
one of the arguments given for expanding the microfinance 
industry was to help poor people escape the clutches of 
‘evil moneylenders’ who allegedly charge usurious rates 
of interest: formal finance was expected to substitute for 
informal sources. However, ‘there is widespread evidence 
that MFI clients widely use informal finance as part of 
their financial management strategy’ (ibid.). He cites a 
1998 case study that collected detailed information on all 
credit transactions in a sample of households in northern 
Bangladesh in a region where several MFIs competed. 
‘Almost all households (87 per cent) reported borrowing 
from informal sources and the proportion was higher for 
MFI clients than for non-clients. Household consumption 
and payment of other loans were the two most frequently 
reported uses of the informal loans’ (ibid.). Mehta and 
Bhattacharya echo these findings, noting that the failure of 
MFIs to reach out to the poor and underserved population 
‘results in the existence of informal moneylenders who 
not only lend their own savings to the poor at exorbitant 
interest rates but also borrow from formal sources for 
further lending to the poor’ (2018: 155). 
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Box 2: Impact of microcredit on poverty reduction
The theory behind microfinance for the poor – and specifically provision of microcredit – was that it ‘would boost 
their income-generating capacity, unbridle their entrepreneurial spirit, support the development of businesses, 
and ultimately alleviate poverty’ (Maitrot and Nino-Zarazua 2017: 1). This fundamental premise that microcredit 
alleviates poverty has increasingly come under question. 
Initial arguments about the poverty-reducing effects of microcredit were largely based on anecdotal evidence, 
descriptive statistics, and impact studies that failed to disentangle causation from correlation (Banerjee, Karlan 
and Zinman 2015: 1). There was a big evidence gap in the first few decades of microcredit’s expansion (Wykstra 
2019). This situation has changed in the past decade, with several studies being carried out across different 
countries and generating substantial systematic evidence on microcredit. Banerjee et al. (2015: 2) give the 
findings of six different randomised controlled trials (RCTs) carried out by economists working independently in 
six countries: Bosnia, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Mongolia, and Morocco. Key findings of the studies in relation to 
different outcomes are as follows: 
• Business activity – Increased access to credit leads to increased business activity. Businesses 
expand, though the extent of expansion may be limited, and there are hints that profits increase.
• Income – Two studies found that increased business income offset reductions in wage income 
(suggesting that microcredit offers people more freedom in their choices of occupation and allows them 
to become more self-reliant) while two studies found increases in both wage and business income.
• Consumption – No evidence was found of an increase in total household consumption, but there was 
a decrease in discretionary spending (recreation/entertainment, temptation goods). There were no 
significant effects on health and education spending.
• Social indicators – No impact was found on child schooling, with the exception of Bosnia which 
showed a significant decline in school attendance among 16–19-year-olds. Only one study reported a 
small but significant increase in female empowerment (ibid.: 11–13). 
Banerjee et al. (2015: 13) conclude that the studies find no clear evidence of reductions in poverty or substantial 
improvements in living standards. However, they stress that this should not obscure other more modest, but 
potentially important, effects: on occupational choice, business scale, consumption choice, female decision 
power, and improved risk management. Furthermore, they note that while there is little evidence to support 
microcredit’s strongest claims (about poverty reduction), ‘there is also little support for microcredit’s harshest 
critics. The studies found little evidence of harmful effects’ (ibid.: 14). 
A 2017 systematic review of poverty and wellbeing impacts of microfinance (Maitrot and Nino-Zarazua 2017: 
6–7) found inconclusive evidence of microfinance impacts on per capita income, non-land asset value, and 
poverty, and on other welfare dimensions including food and non-food consumption, medical expenditures, 
health, nutrition, and education. The positive poverty impacts of microfinance were largely found in studies on 
Bangladesh, which showed that it seems to benefit the vulnerable non-poor more than the extreme poor (ibid.). 
While recent evidence does not point to microcredit leading to reduced poverty, this does not mean it has had 
no positive effects. Wykstra (2019) argues that the results are only disappointing if one thought microcredit could 
get people out of poverty – something that many researchers say was not realistic to begin with. Wykstra cites 
research by Collins et al. (2009) on the financial lives of people living on US$2 or less per day, which shows 
that credit plays a crucial role in borrowers’ lives: helping meet emergencies, pay for a big purchase, or for 
consumption smoothing when income fluctuates. Banerjee et al. echo this, noting that ‘if microcredit’s promise 
were increasing freedom of choice it would be closer to delivering on it’ (2015: 14). 
Source: Based on Bennett, K. (n.d.) ‘Loan Sharks, Microloans and the Highest Interest Rates Around (They Aren’t on Kiva)’,  
https://pages.kiva.org/blog/loan-sharks-microloans-and-the-highest-interest-rates-around-they-arent-on-kiva
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Berg et al.’s study (2016) in Bangladesh presents 
somewhat different findings. The study looked at the 
effects of microcredit penetration into the village credit 
market, focusing on the effects on moneylender interest 
rate and household borrowing from informal sources 
(ibid.: 39). The theory was that microcredit would reduce 
both. The study was based on two large survey data sets 
from Bangladesh, covering almost 800 villages (ibid.: 5). 
It found that:
• Moneylender interest rates do not go down when 
microfinance comes to a village; in fact, the 
interest rate increases when the MFI penetration 
into the village credit markets is high enough. 
• The effect is heterogeneous; at low levels of 
MFI coverage, there does not seem to be any 
perceptible impact, and the effect is strong for the 
villages in the top quartile of coverage. 
• The evidence based on the panel data demonstrates 
clearly that a household’s propensity to borrow 
from informal sources declines significantly once 
it becomes a member of an MFI, and that the total 
volume of credit from informal sources (and formal 
banks) also decrease substantially in both absolute 
and relative terms (ibid.: 40–41). 
The authors conclude that the evidence on the declining 
importance of informal sources in rural credit markets 
along with higher informal interest rates contradicts some 
of the widely held perceptions among contending camps 
of practitioners: 
While our results do not support the view of MFI 
proponents that MFI competition reduces informal 
interest rates, the evidence also rejects the claim 
by the critics that MFIs cause increased reliance 
on informal loans among its borrowers due, 
for example, to rigid repayment schedules and 
indivisibility of investment projects (ibid.: 40). 
Taken together with empirical evidence from other 
studies from Bangladesh on MFIs (cited above), the likely 
explanation is that MFIs attract the less risky borrowers 
with more land and steady sources of income, while the 
moneylenders retain relatively poor and risky borrowers 
(ibid.: 38). 
3.5 Case study: Andhra Pradesh – 
‘Microcredit over‑reach?’ 
Andhra Pradesh in the south-east of India saw a 
‘microfinance explosion’ in the 2000s (Mader 2013). The 
state was home to the four largest MFIs in the country, as 
well as a state-supported programme that promoted self-
help groups (SHGs) and linked them to formal financial 
institutions. The rapid growth in MFIs in Andhra Pradesh 
was fuelled by huge investment in the sector. Prior to 
2006, US$6.3m was invested in Indian microfinance: this 
grew to US$118.3m in 2008 and US$528.6m up to July 
2010 (ibid.: 51). The Indian regulation regime encouraged 
this by making borrowed capital more cheaply and amply 
available for MFIs; the government also failed to regulate 
the sector because MFIs were NBFCs and NGOs, rather 
than banks. The massive equity infusion drove huge 
growth in lending, mostly among the six large MFIs that 
attracted 80 per cent of investments (ibid.). 
However, the immense growth also vastly overstretched 
MFIs’ internal systems, and they cut corners everywhere, 
particularly in the client acquisition process. External 
‘agents’ were apparently widely used to recruit new 
clients. A post-crisis survey of 100 MFIs found that most 
lacked guidelines on lending to clients of other MFIs and 
did not have systems in place for measuring a client’s 
level of indebtedness (Maes and Reed 2012: 6). 
From April 2008 to March 2010, each of the six leading 
MFIs added 2,389 new active clients, or 479 new joint 
loan groups (JLGs) on average every day, so that by 
March 2010 statistically 35.9 per cent of all households 
in Andhra Pradesh had an MFI loan (Mader 2013: 51). 
By November 2010, SHGs and MFIs were reaching over 
23 million clients in the state (Maes and Reed 2012: 6). 
Each loan officer was dealing with 488 loans by 2009 
(Mader 2013: 52). Many clients had loans from several 
different sources, putting the average microfinance 
debt per household in Andhra Pradesh over US$1,700, 
compared to less than US$150 per household in the 
other states of India (Maes and Reed 2012: 6). One study 
found that 83 per cent of microfinance clients in the state 
had loans from more than one source, and many had four 
or more loans at the same time (ibid.). A report from the 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) concluded: 
‘The picture that emerges from the data suggests that 
households in Andhra Pradesh [had] too many loans and 
[more] debt than [seemed] supportable considering their 
income levels and ability to repay’ (ibid.: 6). 
In July 2010, SKS Microfinance Ltd (SKS), the largest 
of the Indian MFIs (with more than seven million clients 
at the time), held an initial public offering (IPO). The IPO 
raised US$155m for SKS and valued the company at 
US$1.5bn; existing shareholders also sold US$195m 
worth of their shares in the offering, making huge profits 
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(Maes and Reed 2012: 6). While the SKS IPO, the first 
by an MFI in India, was seen by some as signalling the 
strength of the sector, on the ground in Andhra Pradesh a 
crisis was brewing.
There were reports as early as June 2010 of default rates 
being far higher than stated, and of MFIs covering them 
up (Mader 2013: 55). There were also reports of coercive 
repayment techniques being used against borrowers. 
Ironically, people resorted to informal loan sharks to 
pay their debts to the MFIs: ‘Traditional moneylenders 
were not being displaced by MFIs, but rather were 
thriving thanks to them, effectively becoming part of the 
business model as moneylender loans were increasingly 
taken to repay MFIs’ (ibid.: 52). In late September and 
October 2010, accounts of borrowers in Andhra Pradesh 
committing suicide accumulated: as of 15 October 2010, 
a total of 30 suicides had been committed in 45 days 
(ibid.; see Biswas 2010).
In response, the Andhra Pradesh government issued an 
Ordinance11 on 15 October 2010 severely restricting the 
activities of MFIs in the state. The Ordinance required 
MFIs to state their interest rates clearly and register all 
recovery personnel in each district they operated in; 
prohibited the recovery of loans and granting of new 
loans until such registration was completed; forbade the 
collection of collateral on loans; forbade the issuing of 
multiple loans to the same borrower group; and banned 
MFIs from deploying any agents for recovery or using any 
other coercive action (Mader 2013: 55). 
11 An Ordinance to Protect the Women Self Help Groups from Exploitation by Micro Finance Institutions in the State of 
Andhra Pradesh and for the Matters Connected Therewith or Incidental Thereto (http://indiamicrofinance.com/wp-content/
uploads/2010/10/Andhra-MFI-Ordinance.pdf).
‘As a result microfinance operations in Andhra Pradesh 
came to a grinding halt’ (Maes and Reed 2012: 6). No 
fresh loans were sanctioned by MFIs, and the loan 
recovery rate fell to under 10 per cent (ibid.). MFI field 
staff were unable to carry out collection duties for fear 
of the punitive measures in the Ordinance. This was 
exacerbated by politicians seeking to make political 
mileage by encouraging borrowers not to repay their 
loans. Poor recovery of loans and lack of liquidity meant 
many small MFIs were threatened with closure. Moreover, 
while resolving the issue of reckless lending, the 
Ordinance also deprived ‘legitimate’ borrowers of access 
to credit.
Mader concludes that the policy of using microcredit 
to address poverty was flawed in design and 
implementation: 
The persistent social crisis of India’s poor 
(particularly in Andhra Pradesh), which 
policymakers sought to address through credit 
via SHGs and MFIs, made borrowers increasingly 
dependent on debt for survival. MFIs competed with 
SHGs and each other to feed that debt dependency. 
The reckless and unregulated growth of the Indian 
microfinance industry, concentrated on one state, 
created a drive for profitability at all costs (including 
human costs), and the industry’s unwillingness to 
heed any warnings, even from well-intentioned 
insiders, sealed its fate (Mader 2013: 61).
Section 4:
COMMUNITY-
BASED FINANCIAL 
ORGANISATIONS
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4 COMMUNITY‑BASED 
FINANCIAL ORGANISATIONS
4.1 CBFOs vs MFIs
As shown above, MFIs can have significant shortcomings. 
A major one is limited outreach. MFIs tend to serve 
populations in urban, semi-urban, and densely populated 
rural areas: it is hard for them to reach people in sparsely 
populated rural areas because transaction costs are so 
high (Ritchie 2007: 35). There is thus a need for low-cost 
organisations that can cover the costs of providing small 
pools of capital for a large number of customers, i.e. can 
carry out a large number of small (in monetary value) 
transactions. Community-based financial organisations 
(CBFOs) meet this need, and represent a viable 
alternative to high-interest informal moneylending. 
The International Fund for Agricultural Development 
(IFAD 2014a: 1) defines ‘community-based financial 
organisation’ as covering a variety of entities that provide 
a range of financial products and services to a small target 
market in a limited geographic zone. They often operate 
in remote areas, are self-formed and self-governing, 
rely partially or wholly on volunteers, and are primarily 
savings driven, mobilising funds from their members 
(ibid.). According to Ritchie the central characteristics of 
CBFOs ‘are their financial and institutional independence, 
and mobilisation and management of their own resources’ 
(2007: 3). Table 1 summarises the main differences 
between CBFOs and MFIs, and compares these to 
high-interest informal moneylenders.
4.2 Types of CBFOs 
While CBFOs have common features, there can be 
many different types of CBFOs – they range from highly 
decentralised, very unsophisticated entities to more 
formal, centralised CBFOs with more sophisticated 
products and services (IFAD 2014a). IFAD (ibid.: 2–6) 
identify three main subgroups of CBFOs according to 
their main mode of operation: small community-based 
time-bound savings groups; small community-based 
accumulating savings groups; and large community-
based cooperative groups.
4.2.1 Small community-based time-bound savings 
groups
These are informal groups in which all members have 
to save a fixed amount of money in each cycle (typically 
each month). All the funds are disbursed to one or more 
members after each cycle, and the groups are dissolved 
once everyone has had their turn to receive funds (or 
the process starts again). They often form and operate 
without any external intervention or support. The main 
examples are rotating savings and credit associations 
(ROSCAs), village savings and loan associations 
(VSLAs), and village banks. 
• ROSCAs usually have 5–20 members (but can be 
up to 30) with compulsory savings by all, loans 
given to each member in turn, and no interest on 
savings. There can be accumulation of savings 
for the first few cycles to establish a credit fund, 
before distributing any funds. 
• VSLAs differ from ROSCAs primarily in that they 
pay interest on savings, and interest is payable on 
loans. 
• Village banks are similar to VSLAs but aim to 
continue operating at the end of each savings–
lending cycle (VSLAs can disband, start anew, or 
have members leave and new members join). 
4.2.2 Small community-based accumulating savings 
groups
Here too, savings are compulsory to be part of the group, 
but size and timing of contributions/withdrawals are more 
flexible. Accumulating funds means they have more 
complex operations than time-bound groups, and they 
can have more capital for lending and thus vary their loan 
products. It also means they have an unlimited life. The 
main examples are accumulating savings and credit 
associations (ASCAs) and self-help groups (SHGs). 
• ASCAs can have around 12 members, but with 
more heterogeneous membership than ROSCAs 
and VSLAs. Members are paid interest on savings 
according to their contributions: they can just 
save, and not take loans. Loans can be larger and 
have a longer maturity than ROSCAs and interest 
is charged on loans. Since operations are more 
complex, rules may be documented, and these are 
harder for non-literate people to manage. 
• Self-help groups have 10–30 members, mostly 
women from similar socioeconomic backgrounds. 
They have links to formal financial institutions 
and use the latter’s deposit facilities for the 
group’s pooled savings; these links also give them 
access to larger and longer-term loans to lend 
to members. They are regulated by the national 
financial institution. Interest is earned on savings 
and paid on loans. They are often trained in the 
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Table 1: Comparison of main characteristics of CBFOs, MFIs and informal moneylenders
Characteristics CBFO MFI Informal 
moneylenders
CLIENT BASE • Common membership, e.g. 
women living in a particular 
village
• Eligibility determined by 
members
• High degree of trust between 
members
• Varied clients
• Eligibility determined by MFI
• Usually people living 
in local community
STAFF • Volunteer members • Paid full-time staff (not 
necessarily clients)
• Moneylenders 
operating individually 
or with partners/staff
MANAGEMENT • Smaller ones managed 
by members, larger ones 
by professional staff and 
management
• Managed by recruited staff • Self-managed
GOVERNANCE • By board – elected by 
members
• By board – appointed/
salaried and elected
• None
REGULATION AND 
OVERSIGHT
• Not compulsory – often 
unregulated in the case of 
smaller CBFOs, e.g. VSLAs, 
but usually in place for 
entities such as credit unions
• Compulsory, but not always 
developed
• None
COLLATERAL FOR 
LOANS
• Includes savings, use of 
guarantor, social collateral of 
the entire local group
• Often group guarantee (as in 
Grameen Bank where clients 
in a group co-guarantee 
each other), or property, 
occasionally guarantor
• None – based on 
moneylenders’ 
local knowledge of 
borrowers
RANGE OF FINANCIAL 
PRODUCTS
• Normally narrow:
 –Savings driven (range of 
products depends on type 
of group)
 –Credit (small loans, rigid 
terms)
 –Sometimes some form of 
solidarity insurance
 –May be possible to link to 
formal financial institutions 
to access other products
• Broader:
 –Savings normally voluntary, 
different products available
 –Credit (larger loans 
available, with longer loan 
terms)
 –Other products offered 
(e.g. insurance)
• Very narrow: credit at 
high interest rates
SIZE OF OUTREACH • Small – typically five to a few 
hundred members
• Normally large – typically 
thousands of clients
• Small – usually 
limited to local 
community
SIZE OF GEOGRAPHIC 
COVERAGE
• Normally small: individual 
groups cover a single 
community/village (unless 
part of a network)
• Wider: large branch 
infrastructure and points of 
sale
• Narrow: since based 
on local knowledge 
and proximity to 
borrowers 
Source: Adapted from IFAD (2014a: 2), plus author.
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required management skills by NGOs and it is 
common practice to change leaders annually to 
build capacity and empowerment. SHGs have 
aims beyond providing financial services, such as 
poverty reduction, awareness raising, increasing 
literacy, and promoting family planning. SHGs are 
especially prevalent in India.
4.2.3 Large community-based cooperative groups 
These are generally larger than time-bound or 
accumulating savings groups and have more formal 
management and governance structures. They are 
savings driven, though depending on the type of group, 
savings can be voluntary or compulsory. Members 
own a cooperative through buying shares or by paying 
membership fees. They are democratically controlled by 
members who appoint the board and annually review 
performance. Examples are self-managed village 
savings and credit banks (CVECAs),12 savings and 
credit cooperatives (SACCOs), and credit unions. 
• CVECAs require members to pay a fee to join 
rather than buying shares. Savings are voluntary. 
Instead of paying dividends to members, the 
annual surplus is reinvested in the CVECA or in the 
village. 
• SACCOs are organised so that each member who 
buys one or more shares has one vote. Rural 
SACCOs will have between 50 and a few hundred 
members; they focus on one village or even a 
segment of the village population (e.g. women). 
Interest can be received on deposits, and a 
dividend is usually paid out of the SACCO surplus; 
interest is charged on loans. 
• Credit unions in rural areas can have between 50 
and a few hundred members (more in urban credit 
unions). Membership is based on a common bond 
such as belonging to the same community or place 
of employment. Each member buys one share 
and has one vote on board election, irrespective 
of amount of savings. Good rates of interest are 
paid on savings. While sometimes supplemented 
by external funds, credit unions largely rely on 
members’ savings and shares to finance loans, 
on which interest is charged. Large credit unions 
offer a full range of financial services, including 
remittances and insurance. They usually have a 
part-time manager, reporting to the elected board, 
12 Caisses Villageoises d’Epargne et de Credit Autogerees. 
and are regulated by the central bank or registrar 
of credit unions or cooperatives. 
4.3 Strengths of CBFOs 
CBFOs have a number of key advantages (IFAD 2014a: 
7–8, 2014b: 7–8; Ritchie 2007): 
• Greater outreach – As shown above, CBFOs are 
capable of achieving considerable outreach in 
remote areas at a relatively low cost compared 
with more formal financial institutions such as 
MFIs. Since they are in close proximity to their 
members, are self-managing, and can operate 
with a relatively low membership, they can be 
established in remote areas with low population 
density, involving people who normally lack access 
to other financial services and products.
• Local ownership and empowerment – CBFOs 
commonly generate a strong sense of ownership 
among members. Due to the local character 
of the organisations, many of the members 
know their fellow villagers and local operating 
conditions; therefore, it is likely that they will take 
a considerable interest. The groups often include 
and empower more marginalised individuals (such 
as poor people or women) who sometimes use 
the group to become involved in other community 
initiatives. In addition, local knowledge and local 
ownership enable members to assess whether 
potential borrowers will be able to repay the loan 
and reject attempts by problematic individuals to 
join a CBFO. 
• Encourage savings culture – CBFOs are 
predominantly compulsory savings-based 
organisations. Not only can this requirement 
help encourage linkages with the formal financial 
sector, it can also promote long-term sustainability. 
Additionally, compulsory saving helps individuals 
build equity, create reserves, smooth consumption 
and mitigate risks. They thus avoid the risk 
associated with microcredit through MFIs that 
already vulnerable poor people will become highly 
indebted through access to credit. 
• Allow replication – The simplicity of the models 
makes it relatively easy for neighbouring villages 
to replicate and develop their own informal 
financial sector. 
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• Possibility to link to formal financial sector – The 
typical member of a decentralised CBFO is poor 
and lives in a remote area, making him/her less 
interesting to the formal financial sector. However, 
20–30 individuals working as a group to establish 
mature savings operations could provide the 
economies of scale necessary to make service 
provision financially worthwhile. The typical 
CBFO becomes more attractive to a bank or large 
credit union if linked to a network of decentralised 
self-managed groups that can be serviced as 
one entity. For members of CBFOs, linkages to 
formal financial institutions can mean access 
to larger loans and other financial products and 
services. Rural populations that have access to 
the more formal financial sector will often choose 
to retain linkages with CBFOs both to diversify 
their incomes and reserves and to reap the social 
benefits CBFOs bring.
4.4 Weaknesses of CBFOs 
However, CBFOs have their limitations (IFAD 2014a: 8–9, 
2014b: 8–9; Ritchie 2007): 
• Limited ability to generate a big pool of funds 
– CBFOs often operate in remote regions and 
have relatively small memberships with limited 
savings capacity. As a result, savings generated by 
CBFOs are relatively small, which constrains their 
capacity to mostly micro or small business and 
consumption activities.
• Restricted range of products and services – The 
low savings capacity and remoteness, as well as 
lack of skilled personnel, also means the range 
of services that rural CBFOs can provide to their 
members is limited. As such, many only provide 
basic savings services and a few loan products.
• Higher interest rates compared to formal financial 
institutions – CBFOs often charge higher interest 
rates than commercial institutions. It may seem 
that, since the amounts loaned are small, the 
high interest rates would encourage short-term 
borrowing, resulting in high repayment rates 
because borrowers would not want to accumulate 
high interest fees on longer loans. However, it has 
been found that high interest rates discourage 
poorer members of CBFOs from taking such loans. 
In the absence of other external cash inflows to 
repay high-interest loans, members who take 
high-interest loans for consumption can end up 
poorer at the end of the business cycle.
• Need for technical assistance and monitoring 
– Typical decentralised financial institutions 
are self-managed and require a considerable 
amount of technical assistance and training at the 
outset in order for the CBFO to manage itself in 
a sustainable manner. Furthermore, they require 
close monitoring and oversight for two to three 
years after their establishment to help them 
become sustainable.
• Lack of financial management capacity and 
weak governance – Many CBFOs are managed 
by members who have little or no financial 
management skills. Fostering management skills 
takes time and requires people with leadership 
skills who are committed to championing the 
group development process. However, it is often 
difficult to find such people in rural areas. Many 
CBFOs’ ‘staff’ volunteer their time on a pro bono 
basis. Without a salary, the level of accountability 
can sometimes be compromised, resulting in 
mismanagement of CBFO funds. It is, therefore, 
recommended that CBFOs aim for salaried staff in 
order to improve financial management skills, and 
have a system of checks and balances to control 
governance and management.
• Vulnerability to elite capture – CBFOs are often 
established in small villages with a strong 
hierarchical structure and power relationships. 
Given the attraction of accessing ‘free money’, 
local elites are often tempted to take over CBFOs 
for their own ends, with the risk that the CBFOs 
collapse and members lose their savings.
• Sustainability not guaranteed for externally funded 
groups – CBFOs that receive external credit funds 
from governments or donors often fail. Poorly 
planned and executed, externally funded CBFOs 
often risk attracting a non-socially cohesive 
membership whose sole purpose is to access ‘free 
money’ rather than encourage their members to 
save and strengthen the group over time. Even 
though savings are compulsory, members are 
likely to view these CBFOs as a way to access 
loans rather than an opportunity to build a savings 
habit, which would be beneficial to both the 
members and the group to ensure liquidity and 
sustainability. 
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4.5 Case study: CARE’s Village 
Savings and Loan Association (VSLA) 
model13 
Over the past 28 years, CARE International has 
developed, extensively tested, and replicated a 
community finance model, the Village Savings and Loan 
Association (VSLA). It provides the rural poor with a 
secure place to save, the opportunity to borrow in modest 
amounts, and convenient access to these services. It is 
transparent in its operations, is inexpensive to set up, 
and can be managed by local people. Evaluations have 
shown it to be an effective solution to meet the needs 
of poor people who live in communities that cannot be 
reached by banks and MFIs.
Originally developed in Niger in 1991, VSLAs now 
operate in 26 African countries, eight Asian countries, and 
Haiti (CARE 2016: 2). Globally (as of 2016) there were 
over 200,000 VSLA groups, with five million members 
(over 70 per cent of them women) generating over 350m 
financial transactions per year (ibid.). Moreover, their 
loan repayment rate was 99 per cent (ibid.). CARE’s 
experience with the VSLA model has matured over 
the years. Beginning with a basic approach designed 
for impoverished and uneducated rural women, it has 
evolved to be a suitable option for literate and non-literate 
people. Numerous development agencies, including 
IFAD, Oxfam, Plan International, World Vision, and 
Catholic Relief Services, have now adopted the model. 
13 This section is largely based on ‘Annex 5. Village Savings and Loan Association Model’ in Ritchie (2007: 56–58).
VSLA is a group savings and loan system in which, 
after training and practice, groups of between 10 and 30 
people have the capacity to govern and manage their 
savings and loan activities. Rules are simple, transparent, 
and easy for every group member to understand. Group 
members either (1) contribute a small fixed amount on 
a weekly basis, or (2) at every meeting, buy between 
one and five shares that have a fixed purchase price. 
The amount of the contribution or the share value is 
set by the group. After several weeks, the group begins 
making loans to members, with the loan term and interest 
rate decided by the group. Most of the loans are used 
for income-generating activities. The groups use their 
own savings as the source of loan capital and there is 
no external long-term dependency either for technical 
support or loan fund capitalisation.
At the end of the first year, the savings and interest 
collected on loans are distributed to the members; some 
may be retained to start the next annual cycle of loans 
at a level that avoids waiting for the slow build-up of a 
useful sum. The main reasons for distributing the funds 
are to keep the size of the funds within the management 
capacity of the group members and to allow the members 
use of their accumulated funds at a time of year when a 
large sum of money is needed, such as for agricultural 
inputs or education expenses. The groups then restart 
their operations, after allowing members who do not want 
to continue participating to leave and others to join.
Box 3: Characteristics of sustainable CBFOs
IFAD lists the following characteristics of a sustainable CBFO:
• Mobilises sufficient savings to provide a good range of loans to its members;
• Pays near market rates of interest;
• Follows best practice in management and governance;
• Has a well-written constitution and sound rules and regulations;
• Shows strong commitment by members to the success of the CBFO as 
witnessed by good attendance at meetings, low to no loan defaults, and effective 
management and governance;
• Provides control against elite capture;
• Uses an external auditor for annual financial statements; and
• Remunerates its management.
Source: IFAD (2014a: 10).
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A variety of studies of the VSLA programme have 
indicated that members who operate small economic 
activities tend to keep their businesses in operation 
throughout the year, have a bigger say in household 
decisions, enjoy better nutrition, invest more in their 
children’s education, and enjoy a higher social status than 
non-members. There is a significant increase in small 
household and livestock assets, usually those controlled 
by women. The loans given out by the groups tend to be 
used almost exclusively for income-generating activities, 
such as purchasing inventory for a small store, feeding 
livestock, and petty trade. The shared-out funds from 
the savings groups tend to be used primarily for food, 
clothing, school fees, and life-cycle events.
Unlike most ASCAs and many other community-based 
programmes, members can withdraw their savings at any 
time throughout the cycle, if in need. The loss of accrued 
interest earnings is a disincentive to do so, especially 
late in the cycle, but access to savings has become an 
important principle of VSLAs.
Many of the strengths of the VSLA model lie in what it 
is not. It is not complicated. It is not expensive. It is not 
donor driven. It is not dependent on rigid structures or 
outside investment. Most important, it does not depend 
on long-term technical support, which distinguishes 
it from most other community-based microfinance 
methodologies. The model is easily replicable, 
inexpensive to establish, and requires minimal training. 
Successful implementation does not need highly trained 
experts, large budgets, and long time frames to reach 
sustainability. It is a model that has the potential to be 
massively scaled up, 
Box 4: Women’s CBFO in Yangon, Myanmar
The Yakhine Yo Ley neighbourhood would not exist if it were not for a group of women who 
came together to escape the clutches of loan sharks. In recent years, the community of a 
few dozen households has sprung up on what used to be fields on a strip of land in Yangon’s 
Hlaing Tharyar township, and the families, although burdened by poverty and debt, funded 
it all themselves. Their secret was simple: in 2009 a group of women who lived in flimsy 
bamboo shacks nearby started pooling their money – just a few hundred kyats a week – into 
a savings fund. When the pot grew big enough, they started taking out small loans. Because 
they collectively managed the fund, they were able to set interest at well below the often 
extortionate rates charged by Myanmar’s informal moneylenders. The families can take out 
loans twice a year, often used to pay off outstanding debts, to buy stock for their businesses, 
or for children’s education.
The project was started by Women for the World (WFW), a local non-profit organisation 
that took its cue from similar projects that had worked well in Thailand. Myanmar’s formal 
financial sector is only just beginning to recover from decades of economic mismanagement. 
But while banks are expanding their presence and foreign microfinance enterprises have 
set up shop, access to fairly priced credit remains beyond the reach of a large proportion of 
Myanmar’s citizens. Schemes like the one in Yakhine Yo Ley offer a way for communities 
to generate finance without relying on the country’s expensive informal lenders or its 
still-decrepit banking infrastructure.
Source: Adapted from ‘Yangon Women use Group Savings to Escape Clutches of Loan Sharks’, Myanmar Business Times,  
30 April 2017, www.shwemyanmar.info/news_detail_m.php?id=4456&type=2
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5 ROLE FOR DEVELOPMENT 
PARTNERS
5.1 Support for microcredit provision
5.1.1 Donor programme evaluations
Microfinance and microcredit has been a significant 
area for donor support. The argument put forward 
by Muhammed Yunus that giving poor people credit 
could help them earn money and lift themselves out of 
poverty had huge appeal – which was backed by huge 
investment. Among the biggest supporters of microfinance 
has been the World Bank, which describes itself as: 
a leading innovator in microfinance, promoting 
developments in technology, financial products, 
and business practices to help financial institutions 
reach more poor people, more cost effectively. 
We help build the institutional capacity of a whole 
range of providers, from banks and microfinance 
institutions to credit unions and self-help groups. 
As these institutions become stronger and more 
financially sound, they can extend their reach, 
improve their efficiency, and increase the range and 
quality of services they offer.14
It is beyond the scope of this review to look at the 
full range of individual donor programmes supporting 
microfinance (microcredit). Instead a selection of 
evaluation findings are given here: (1) an overall 
evaluation of World Bank and UNDP microfinance 
projects; (2) a synthesis of microcredit impact evaluations; 
and (3) an evaluation of a European Union programme in 
Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific.
Rosenberg’s evaluation covered 66 UNDP microcredit 
projects (almost all funding retail credit activity) that 
were active in 2003 or had ended in 2001 or 2002, and 
69 lines of microcredit approved by the World Bank15 
between 1993 and 2002 (Rosenberg 2006: 3). The 
evaluations focused on levels of loan repayment and 
cost recovery (since these were easier to measure than 
client welfare). They revealed a disappointing picture: 
in both agencies, less than a quarter of the projects that 
funded microlending were judged successful. The rest 
failed, or appeared unlikely to produce long-lasting results, 
i.e. retail institutions and programmes that could continue 
to offer clients quality financial services over the longer 
14 www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/industry_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/financial+institutions/resources/
the+world+bank+group+and+microfinance
15 As well as funding credit lines, the World Bank also supports microfinance through policy work and technical assistance, but these 
activities were not included in the evaluation.
16 Danish International Development Agency.
term without losing their capital and needing continuing 
infusions of money from governments or development 
agencies (ibid.: 1). In both agencies, Rosenberg attributed 
the problems to agency environments and systems that 
did not give staff the right incentives, information and 
resources for microcredit (ibid.). The report noted that both 
agencies had made changes in response to the findings. 
DANIDA’s16 synthesis of microcredit impact evaluations 
is a little more recent (Kovsted et al. 2009). In contrast to 
Rosenberg’s evaluations, these studies do focus on the 
impact of microcredit on poverty reduction, measured 
in terms of consumption and income. The evaluations 
reviewed in the synthesis comprised: those in peer-
reviewed international journals; those by NGOs; and those 
by both bilateral and multilateral donors (ibid.: 5). The 
latter comprised 23 impact evaluations and five surveys 
(ibid.: 19). Most of the studies included were from either 
South Asia or Latin America, reflecting the prevalence of 
microcredit in those regions. With the exception of one 
study, the impact evaluations conducted by bilateral and 
multilateral donors found positive effects of microcredit on 
household income or expenditure (the positive effects were 
even more significant for evaluations by NGOs) (ibid.: 31). 
[This was in contrast to the peer-reviewed journal studies 
which found more ambiguous effects.] However, the donor 
evaluations found that the microcredit programmes never 
reached the stated target audience of the poorest of the 
poor – suggesting that they benefit the wealthier more 
(ibid.). The report also notes that microcredit programmes 
continue to rely on donor subsidies (ibid.: 38). 
The final evaluation assesses the performance of the 
European Union’s African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
Microfinance Programme, which ran from 2005 to 2010 
(European Commission 2012). The programme focused 
on capacity building and good practice dissemination 
across the ACP regions, and deployed a total of €15m 
(ibid.: i). Overall, the evaluation concluded that the 
programme clearly contributed to progress in the ACP 
microfinance sector, in terms of building capacities 
of MFIs and also, in particular, of strengthening the 
knowledge and practices of the overall microfinance 
community. However, this overall positive assessment 
was somewhat tempered by the fact that long-run 
sustainability was questionable for some programme 
results. In particular, the evaluation found that second-tier 
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MFIs and networks would have difficulties because of 
their need for ongoing grant and technical support. 
The literature shows a clear tendency to attribute at least 
some responsibility for the shortcomings of microcredit 
(discussed in Section 2) on the donor agencies which 
have promoted MFIs, in particular the World Bank. Milford 
Bateman is a long-standing critic of microfinance as a 
mechanism to bring about poverty reduction. In a 2017 
paper, he targets the World Bank, accusing it of pushing 
microcredit and thereby of failing the poor. He cites the 
example of Cambodia, which saw: 
expansion of microcredit after 2009 thanks to a 
flood of foreign investment and technical support, 
including that provided by the Bank and its private-
sector arm, the International Financial Corporation 
(IFC). The IFC has, rather opportunistically, made 
a major capital gain from taking an equity stake 
in ACLEDA, the country’s largest microcredit 
institution. Yet ultra-rapid growth driven by 
17 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEMPOWERMENT/Resources/14872_CGAP-web.pdf
spectacular profitability has brought the sector to the 
verge of meltdown, and the Cambodian government 
has been forced into taking a series of aggressive 
and costly measures of late in order to limit the 
inevitable damage (Bateman 2017: 3). 
In the context of this review, which is interested in 
whether microcredit can combat high-interest informal 
lending, it is important to note that this is not mentioned 
as a performance indicator or outcome in any of the 
impact evaluations of donor microcredit programmes. As 
outlined above, these are judged either on the basis of 
MFI financial sustainability (cost recovery), or on a client’s 
income/expenditure.
5.1.2 Good practice guidelines
The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) 
was set up by the World Bank in 1995, initially as a 
three-year initiative.17 Still going, CGAP is a global 
partnership of 30 leading development organisations 
Table 2: Financial system levels and role of donors and investors
Level of the financial system Role of donors and investors
MICRO LEVEL A wide range of financial and non-financial 
institutions, including NGOs; savings and credit 
cooperatives; private and state-owned banks; 
postal banks; member-owned community 
organisations; non-bank intermediaries, such 
as finance or insurance companies; and other 
suppliers (moneylenders, agricultural traders, 
etc.). The micro level is the backbone of the 
financial system.
Strengthen financial service providers to 
achieve financial sustainability, which is 
essential to reach significant numbers of poor 
people and to realise long-term social returns, 
support experimentation, and provide capital to 
expand the reach of retail financial institutions 
when the supply of commercial financing is 
limited.
MESO LEVEL Locally available market infrastructure and 
services, including auditors, rating agencies, 
networks and associations, credit bureaus, 
transfer and payments systems, and 
information technology and technical service 
providers.
Strengthen the capacity of meso-level actors 
and extend their services to microfinance – 
include microfinance in the mainstream, rather 
than marginalise it.
MACRO LEVEL A conducive, stable macroeconomic and policy 
environment provided by the appropriate 
government entities.
Support interest rate liberalisation, inflation 
control, and prudential regulation and 
supervision of deposit-taking institutions. 
Donors should not support the direct provision 
of credit by governments.
Source: CGAP (2006: ix).
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that works to advance the lives of poor people through 
financial inclusion. Members include the World Bank, 
UNDP, UK Aid, Global Affairs Canada, USAID, the 
European Commission, and the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation.18 Table 2 summarises the role that donors 
and investors can play at each level of the financial 
system in relation to microfinance according to CGAP. 
CGAP (2006: i) has developed good practice guidelines 
on microfinance for donors. Those directly relevant to 
microcredit are as follows:
• Microfinance means building financial systems 
that serve the poor. Microfinance will reach its full 
potential only if it is integrated into a country’s 
mainstream financial system. 
• Microfinance is about building permanent local 
financial institutions that can attract domestic 
deposits, recycle them into loans, and provide 
other financial services.
• Microfinance can pay for itself, and must do so if 
it is to reach very large numbers of poor people. 
Unless microfinance providers charge enough to 
cover their costs, they will always be limited by 
the scarce and uncertain supply of subsidies from 
donors and governments. 
• Interest rate ceilings hurt poor people by making 
it harder for them to get credit. The cost of making 
many small loans is more than making a few large 
ones. Interest rate ceilings prevent MFIs from 
covering their costs, and thereby choke off the 
supply of credit for poor people. 
• The job of government is to enable financial 
services, not to provide them directly. Governments 
can almost never do a good job of lending, but they 
can set a supporting policy environment. 
• Donor funds should complement private capital, 
not compete with it. Donors should use appropriate 
grant, loan, and equity instruments on a temporary 
basis to build the institutional capacity of financial 
providers, develop support infrastructure, and 
support experimental services and products. 
• The key bottleneck is the shortage of strong 
institutions and managers. Donors should focus 
their support on building capacity. 
• Microfinance works best when it measures  – 
and discloses – its performance. MFIs need to 
produce accurate and comparable reporting on 
18 www.cgap.org/about/member-organizations
financial performance (e.g. loan repayment and 
cost recovery) as well as social performance 
(e.g. number and poverty level of clients being 
served).
• Microcredit is not always the answer. Other kinds 
of support may work better for people who are so 
destitute that they are without income or means of 
repayment. 
5.2 Support for CBFOs
5.2.1 Donor programme evaluations
Rosenberg’s evaluation of World Bank and UNDP 
microcredit programmes included support for community-
managed revolving funds, i.e. CBFOs. He found that 
these were increasingly popular but, despite having easier 
standards than those for MFIs, had low ratings. Fourteen 
UNDP projects were revolving funds, of which not a single 
one got a ‘Good’ rating; the World Bank had 23 such 
projects of which only one was rated ‘Good’ (Rosenberg 
2006: 5–6). For both agencies, loans to group members 
were financed mainly by an upfront capital injection by 
a donor or government. ‘This kind of project practically 
never works well: most of the revolving funds don’t 
revolve for very long, because defaulters expropriate the 
resources that were meant to fund lending services for all 
group members over time’ (ibid.: 6). He cites a subsequent 
CGAP study of 70 revolving funds financed by various 
agencies, which produced similar results (ibid.). The only 
successes were found in savings-based groups and self-
help groups. In the former, members lent out funds raised 
through their own deposits, rather than external funds, 
and hence were more careful with lending and collection. 
In the latter, groups began by collecting and then lending 
out their own savings, but some later got external loans 
from formal banks – while some of these self-help groups 
worked well, the majority were weak (ibid.).
5.2.2 Good practice guidelines
Bateman calls for donor agencies like the World Bank to 
support CBFOs rather than commercialised MFIs: 
The local financial system in the global South needs 
urgent change: it needs a reboot in the direction 
of community-owned and controlled financial 
institutions, such as credit unions, cooperative 
banks and municipal development banks, that by 
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design lock-in the priority to promote sustainable 
development and equitably serve the poor, not 
simply maximise profit for a narrow spectrum of 
already wealthy supporters (Bateman 2017: 4).
In providing support to CBFOs the following points need 
to be kept in mind (IFAD 2014a; Ritchie 2007):
• Access to external credit – Providing quick access 
to external credit directly to CBFOs as a means to 
help them grow faster can be counterproductive. 
Experience has shown that poorly designed access 
to external credit damages the CBFOs because it 
reduces the incentive of members to save, skews 
the emphasis of the institution towards borrowers 
rather than savers, leads to weakened credit 
analysis and leads to neglected loan recovery.
• External support to manage the CBFO – CBFOs are 
intended to be community-owned and managed, 
and having external professionals undertake 
these tasks undermines their ownership and 
sustainability. However, in the early stages, CBFOs 
do need help: hence support should take the form 
of mentoring and capacity building. Some limited 
gaps may need to be externally filled where high-
level professional expertise is not readily available.
• Making the CBFOs supply driven – Donors 
supporting CBFOs can be tempted to provide large 
amounts of technical assistance and support. 
However, it is important to be realistic about how 
much assistance CBFOs can absorb, and not 
pressure them to absorb too much just to meet 
donor disbursement requirements.
• Monitoring and evaluation – CBFOs should not 
be exempt from monitoring and evaluation (M&E), 
regardless of their size and informal status. An 
M&E system with clear key performance indicators 
(KPIs) on outreach and organisational performance 
needs to be built into any support project at the 
outset. The precise indicators will depend on the 
type of CBFO and the level of formality. Informal 
CBFOs can report less frequently and performance 
can be managed at an aggregate level, compared 
to more formal CBFOs which will require individual 
performance management and frequent reporting 
(e.g. quarterly).
• Second-tier organisations – Given that donors will 
typically be providing support to small, scattered 
CBFOs, it would be prudent to work with an 
existing second-tier organisation (e.g. unions, 
federations, NGOs). This arrangement can provide 
economies of scale (reducing per unit costs of 
technical assistance) and scope (allowing standard 
operating procedures to be introduced across a 
large number of CBFOs). However, CBFOs may 
have to sacrifice some local identity and control in 
working with a second-tier organisation, and being 
both local and networked can be challenging for 
governance. 
IFAD does not support the creation of new CBFOs but 
rather identifies existing CBFOs that are likely to be 
successful and builds their capacities and outreach 
(IFAD 2014a).
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6 CONCLUSION
High-interest informal lending has long had a bad 
reputation, and this literature review confirms that it is 
indeed associated with many negative traits: coercion, 
violence, bonded labour, debt traps, and so on. However, 
the literature shows that it can also serve a positive role 
for poor communities, providing a ready source of credit 
when needed. 
Of the three main approaches to combating high-interest 
informal lending – increasing access to (formal) credit, 
legislation, and debt relief – only the first has been tried 
on a significant scale. Literature on legislative efforts and 
debt relief was very limited and indicates, in the case of 
the former, that implementation has been weak. MFIs 
are widely established in developing countries, and have 
shown some success in poverty reduction, empowering 
women, and promoting micro-entrepreneurship. However, 
this review highlights significant shortcomings with 
MFIs, in particular, as they become more large scale 
and try to achieve financial sustainability. In the context 
of combating high-interest informal moneylending, the 
evidence indicates that microfinance is not always the 
best approach and can even exacerbate the problem – 
with people borrowing from moneylenders to make MFI 
repayments. CBFOs avoid some of the shortcomings 
of MFIs, but have their own constraints, notably in 
the financial products they offer and scale of lending. 
Furthermore, the literature provides scant evidence of 
the impact of CBFOs on use of high-interest informal 
moneylending. Overall, this review highlights the 
need for more research on how high-interest informal 
moneylending operates in different contexts, and what 
interventions could be effective in combating it.
For donors, appropriate support for MFIs and CBFOs 
can help increase access to credit for poor communities 
and thus reduce the need to turn to high-interest informal 
moneylenders. However, as with understanding of 
high-interest informal moneylending itself, much more 
effort and resources need to be put into assessing the 
impact of diverse interventions such as microfinance and 
CBFOs, and learning and applying the lessons for future 
interventions. Donors also need to think ‘outside the 
box’, and design interventions that more directly combat 
informal moneylending. Support for MFIs, for example, 
is largely aimed at bringing about poverty reduction 
rather than specifically to combat informal moneylending. 
A more targeted approach, based on a thorough 
understanding of how the practice works and what drives 
it, will help donors make more effective responses. 
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